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Hume’s　General　Point　of　View　and
　　　　Smith’s　Impartial　Spectator
Naoki　Yajima
1．Intrduction
Hume　and　Smith　bo血developed　moral血eodes伽班e　b細ed　on　the
key　concept　of’s抑pa血y°．　Many　s叩pose　that　Hume　and　Smith　share　a
similar　understanding　of　symPa血y　as　it　signifies　their　moral　sent㎞ents
tlleory．　However，　this　paper　will　show　that　this　assumption　is　untme．
S卿a血y　as　viewed　by　Hume　and　by　Smi血equally　signifies　a　departure
丘om　Francis　Hutcheson，s　moral　theory．　It　is　illteresting　to　discuss　how
the　tWo　systems　arrive　at　very　different　philosophical　des血ations．
　　Hutcheson，s　moral　theory　is　based　on　t　le　core　concept　of　benevolence，
according　to　which　virtue　consists　in　being　benevolent　to　others．
Hutcheson雪s　idea　is　a　philosophical　application　of　the　Christian　ethic　of
loving　one曾s　neighbour．　Wi舳e　emergence　of　a　commercial　society，
however，　a　new　type　of　moral　theory　was　needed．　Hume　criticises
Hutcheson曹s　assumption　that　man　is　bom　with　a　moral　sense　capable　of
perceivin9　benevolence，　and　substitutes　that　sense　with　the　mechanism
of　sy卑pathy．
　　This　distinction　in　the　poncept　of　sympathy　implies　that　the　celltral
locus　of　morality　shifts丘om　the　meritorious　moral　capacity　of　an
individual　to　the　relationship　that　individuals　create　in　their　social
context．　Hume曾s　concept　of　sylnpathy　is　that　it血nctions　as　a　basis　of
human　relationships　in　that　it　is　the　mechanism　for　transforming　the
㎞pressions　of　other　people　ilito　one，s　own　after　receiving　them　in　the
form　of　ideas．　Because　people　are　capable　of　sha血g　the　impressions　of
o血ers，　they　can　have　a　common　understa　ld血g　about　a　si伽don，　which
then　leads　tO　proper　communication　betWeen　people．
　　Smith°s　theory，　by　virtUe　of山e　advantage　of　being　published　later　than
Hume，s，　is　also　developed　from　Hume．　He　adopts　the　collcept　of．
sy1叩athy丘om　Hume　as　the　core　concept　of　his　moral　philosophy．　Most
important　of　all，　Smith　develops　his　concept　of　’the　impanial　spectatof
丘om　Humels　concept　of，the　genera1　point　of　View’．　Accord血g　to　Hume，
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moral　seni㎞ent　can　be　appropriate　when　it　is　obtained丘om　the　general
point　of　view．　On　the　other　hand，　Smith　llolds　that　the　sympathy　of　an
㎞partial　spectator　represents　dle　moral　standard　that　everyone　should
accept　fbr　attaining　a　proper　moral　relationsllip．　All　action　can　be
approved　when　an　impanial　spectator　’can　go　along　with曾the　motivation
of　an　agent．　Smith　does　not　doubt　the　priority　of　the　right　over　the　good
in　an　actio11，　and　criticises　Hume　for　basing　the　morality　of　an　action　on
its　utility。
　　Therefbre，　it　is　only　natural　that　Smith　develops　llis　concept　of　the
impa』rtial　spectator　as　the　9rounds　for　justification　He　also　intends　in　his
revision　of，The　Theory　of　Moml　Sellt㎞ents°to　criticise　Mandeville，s
moral　theory，　wllich　is　based　on，vanity9．　Eventually，　this　concept　of　the
㎞partial　spectator　develops　hlto　onels　conscience　as　the　role　of　the°all。
s㏄ing　Judgel　who　overrides　the　verdicts　of　actual　sp㏄tators．　This　also
means　that　Smith，　by　equating　moral　criteria　with　the　verdict　of　God，
abandons　the　fimdamental　fUnction　of　syl口pathy　as　the　basic　p血ciple　of
communication　among　equal　people，　and　falls　back　to　a　theological
POsition血1　this　matter．
　　It　is　interesting　that　Hume　develops　his　theory　of　sympathy　wllile
de曲g舳血e　human　phenomenon　of　’pride’　as　an　obvious　alternative
to°va　nity’．　Contrary　to　S血血’s　misunderstanding，］E【ume　does　not　regard
utility　as　the　criterion　of　approval．　Nor　does　the血nction　of　the　general
poillt　of　view　consist　in　measuring　the　utility　of　an　action．　Hume’s
general　pOi　lt　of　view　is　not　a　puerile　form　of　Smith，s　impartia1　spectatOr，
but　rather　signifies　the　f（）110wing　two　characteristics　that　are　not　fbund　in
Smithls㎞partial　spectator．　First，　a　’general’　point　of　View　is　distinct　from
an，im脚iall　point　of　view．　Hume　would’not　describe　it　as　impartial
because　impaniality　is　a　va　lue－ridden　concept　that　needs負】血er　analysis．
Second，　a　point　of曹view，　is　dis血ct丘om　the　’judgementl　of　a　spectator．
Views　can　be　held　by　anyone，　but　a　spectatofs　judgement　is　based　on　his
own　consideration　that　will　need　fUrther　justification．　For　this　reason，
Smith　eventUally　identifies　his　impartial　spectator　as　a　substitute　for　G（》d．
Hume’s　general　point　of　view，　on　the　other　hand　is　not　inherited　by
specific　persons．　It　is　general　as　oPPosed　to　specific，　and　consists　in
ellabling　people　to　avoid　collflicts　while　reaching　agreement　on　tlle
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mea1ゴng　of　a　moral　situation．
Bo止Hume’s　lgeneral　pOint　of　View’　and　Smi血’s，im画a1隅甑of
represent　the　core　characteristic　of　the廿theories，　and　are　necessary　fbr
tlle　development　of　their　respective　lmderstandillg　of　sympathy．　Tlle
striking　difference　between　the　two　systems　can　be　traced　to　their
ftndamental　aUitUdes　toward，the　design　argum6nt’．　Smith璽s　hidden　but
constant　theme　is　to　prescribe　the　way　of　b血1ging　God章s　providence　into
血is　world．　Smith　considers　the　pmblem　of　worldly　order　in　the　tradition
of　Scottish　Calvinist　theology．　Smith’s　impartial　spectator　demonstrates
how　Godls　design　is　realised　on　earth　di　fferently　from　the　way　the
invisible　hand　realises　providence　despite　ignorance　of　people　seekng　to
satisfンtheir　individual　interests．　Hume，110wever，　uncompromisingly
criticises　the　design　argulnent，　and　es1ゆlishes　his　altemative　based　on
lcustom°that　embodies　generality．　Hume，s　general　poillt　of　view
rePresentS　the　way　man　forms　a　spOntaneous　order，　as　dist血ct丘om　the
providence　of　God．　This　also　explains　why　Hume　alld　Smith　have
different　explallations　regarding　justice．　For　Smith，　justice　ultimately
means　the　apProval　of　God；for・Hume，　justice　can　be　re血ced　to　peoPle’s
mutual　self－interest　that　is　recognizable丘om　the　general　point　of　view．
　　Hume，s　achievement　can　best　be　understood　in　contrast　to　the　theoly
of　his　best丘iend　and　the　most　distinguished　contemporary　philosopher，
Adam　Smith．　Flmdam㎝tally，　Hume，s面ticism　of　causality　proves　to　be
an　attempt　to　replace　God’s　providence　with　a　human　order　formed
around　the　general　point　of　view．　Hume，s　philosophy　destroys　the
possibility　of　a　divine　hamlony，　and　shows　how　order，　epistemological，
psychological，　moral，　and　poli恒cal，　develops　from　human　nature．
2．Historical　Bacnground
　　Reaction　tO　Hobbesian　doct血e　domhlated　tlle　moral　pllilosoplly　of　the
171血and血e　l　81血centuロy　bOt血j血England　and　j血Sootland．　Cambridge
Platonists　criticized　Hobbes璽materialism　while　developing　a　deistic
doct血e．　John　Locke，　in　his　reliance　on　the　facUlty　of　reaso叫　was　in　part
an　heir　of　their　legacy．　Third　Earl　of　Slla丘esbury，　Locke電s　student，
denied，　under　an　influence丘om　Roman　classics，　the　atomistic　and
egoistic　picture　of　human　be血gs，　a血d　emphasiZed　their　social　mature．①
、
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He　called　the　intuitive　capacity　that　hamlonizes　the　whole　universe　and
individuals雪moral　sense，．　Francis　Hutcheson，　in　his　efforts　to　defend　this
concept丘om　the　attack　of　Bernard　MandeVille，　developed血e　d㏄㎞e
of　moral　sense．　According　to　Hutcheson，　the　morality　of　an　action　was
recognized　by　mora1　sense　when　the　action　was　based　on　benevolence．
　　While　being　influenced　by　Hutcheson　in　his　emphasis　on　the
importance　of　sentiments　as　the　basis　of　morality，　Hume　introduces　a
different　perspective　from　HutCheson．　Unlike　HutCheson，　Hume　does　not
presume　moral　sense　which　is　inherent血human　beings，　and　exclusively
deals　with　perceptions　that　are　bo血moral　and　non－moral　ones．
　　It　is　interesting　to　note　the　historical　situation　in　which　tllese
philosophers　competed　to　present　their　theories．　There　was　an　emerging
civil　society．　It　would　be　possible　to　define　civil　society　in　many　ways，
but　here　it　is　enough　to　confirm　that　modern　civil　society　is　an
血dustrious　and　commercial　society　in　which血e　basic　assets　shift　from
land　to　money，　and　where　a　substantial　number　of　the　general　public
rather　than　a　handfU1　of　aristocracy　dom血ate．
　　Most　simply，　Hutcheson曾s　answer　to　this　new　sit皿ation　was　to　promote
，more　benevolencel．　Hutcheson血ought　thaちas　society　expanded，　more
benevolence　would　be　needed　to　meet　the　wider　range　of　social
co㎜皿ication．　He　formulated　the　ideal　of　the　vi血e　of　the皿iversal
benevolence　as　’the　greatest　happiness　of　the　greatest　numbef血飢was
later　famously　used　as　the　basic　tenet　of　utilitarianism　by　Bentham．
Hutcheson°s　notion　of　benevolence　was　modelled　on　Christia血10ve．
　　Hume　could　not　be　satisfied　with　Hutcheson’s　solution．　The　central
principle　of　Hume，s　associationist　psychology　already　represents　the
decisive　reason　why　the　Hutchesonian　solution　is　unacceptable．
According　to　Hutchesonls　principle，　the　human　mind　is　so　constituted
山at　one　tends　to　feel　stronger　affection　to　those　who　are　closer　to　him．　In
accordance　with　the　distance　one　is丘om　the　person，　one　tendS　to　feel　a
strollger　or　weaker　affection．　Hence　there　can　be　no　ulliversaI
benevolence．　Human　beings　camot　enact　universal　benevolence　not
because　they　are　morally　wicked　bllt　because　of　the　fundamental
psychological　constitUtion　of　human　beings．魅mders伽｛lmg　reflects
Hume，s　basic　procedure　of　not　assuming　any　nomlative　understanding
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when　he　deals　with　the　elucidation　of　morality．（2）
3．The面erence　of　sympathy　between　Hume　and　Smith
　　Hume’s　concept．　of　sympathy　signifies　the　most　remarkable　depa血re
丘om　the　Hutchesonian　moral　theory．　The　basic　fUnction　of　sympathy　in
Hume　is　to　convert　ideas　into　impressions．（3）
　　Hume　does　not　deny　bellevolence　as　vi血le；it　merely　is　not　adopted　as
the　basis　of　Hume’s　moral　system　because　of　his　moral　6pistemology．
Hume’s　exclusive　dealing　with　perceptions　enables　him　to　present　a
theory　which　explains　the　dynamic　fbmlation　of　a　new　society，　or　a
society　whose　central　charactedstic　lies　in　its　being　constantly　fluid：a
collst㎝【t　flow　of　money，　goods，　and　people．　Smith　obviously　allies　with
Hume血血s皿de醐曲g．　He　shares出e　same　a面加de　with　Hume血
that　he　fbcuses　on　the　lluman　relationship　rather　than　a　static　moral
characteristic　inherent　in　individua1　human　beings血d叩endent　of　and
prior　to　social　interactions．
　　Smith　stalts　his　argulnent　by　introduc血g　his　concept　of　syn取pathy．　It　is
well　known　that　the　concept　of　sympathy　in　Smith　as　well　as　in　Hume　is
used　as　a　uniquely　technical　tem．　The　most　cnlcial　fしmction　of　sy卑pathy
in　Smith　is　to　enable　people　to　approve　of　a　person　in　a　moral　situation．
This　already　signifies　a　cmcial　depa血re丘om　Hutcheson壁s　theory　that
fbcuses　on　the　characte】dstics　of　a　vimous　person．　Sylnpathy　is　first
possible　when　there町e　human　relationships．　Ih　other　words，　by　fbcusing
on　sy坦pathy，　morality　becomes　a　matter　of　human　relationsllips，　rather
tha血of　the　meritorious　characteristic　of　a　v血ous　person．
　　Let　us　be　reminded　that　Smith　indicates　in血e　41h　edition　of　his　7乃e
77ieor　」2　ofMoral　Sentime〃ts　a　subtitle，　which　reads，An　Essay　towards　an
Analysis　of　the　p血ciples　by　which　Men　naturally　judge　conceming　the
Conduct　and　Character，　first　of　their　Neighbours，　and　afterwards　of
themselves’．　The　s曲title　is　significant　because　it　informs　us　of　the　tWo
important　features　of　his　theory．　First，　it　is　a　theory　of　a　moral
judgement．　Second，　Smith　presupPoses　both　the　person　who　makes　a
moral　judgement　and　his　neighbours　who　are　to　be　judged．　And　the
morality　of　the　person　himself　is　to　be　judged　after　the　manner　that　one
judges　his　neighbours，　i．e．　by　regarding　h㎞self　as　his　neighbour．
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　　Therefbre，　in　Smith，　sy卑pathy　is　an　important　means　of　making　a
moral　judgemellt　rather　than　representing　any　specific　sentiment　like
benevolence．　Smithean　symPathy　obtains　where血1ere　is　a　concu1Tence　of
seni㎞entS　between血e　person　who　observes　the　situation　and　the　person
who　is　a丘eCted　by　the　action．　One　ilnagines　oneself　to　be　ill　the　situation
of　other　people，　and　compares　the　seni㎞ent　of　other　pcople　With血e　one
he　woU　ld　feel　were　he　in　the　position　of　the　person　observed．　If　the　two
sentirnents　are　the　salne　in　degree，　then　symPathy　obtains．　An　occurrence
of　symPathy　signifies　apProva1，　and　an　absence　of　symPathy　signifies
disapProval．
Smi血observes　as　a　fact　of　human　nature　that　sympathy　is　in　itself　a
pleasant　sense　of　harmony　betWeen　people，　and　the　natUral　agreeableness
6f　experiencing　the　apProval　of　other　pegple　urges　one　to　seek　fbr
sympa血y．　Seekmg　the　approval　of　others　is　alleged　to　be　the　strongest
㎞clina廿on　of　human　beings　second　only　to　sel」f－preservation．　This　is血e
S血thean　reason　to　be　mora1．　Generally，　an　observer，　as　a　third　person，
tends　to　have　a　weaker　sentiment　than　the　person　p血1adly　concemed．
Therefbre，　in　order　to　attain　sy叫pathy　most　e脆ctively，　the　observer
should　try　to　raise　the　level　of　his　sent㎞ent，　and　the　person　pr血iarily
concerned　should　try　to　lower　the　level　of　his　sent㎞ent　so　that　even　the
third　person　lcan　go　along　with，　his　sentiment　toward　the　situation．　hl
most　cases，　primary　and　stronger　efforts　are　required　of　the　persoll
affected　ra血er　than　the　ol）server．　SylnPathy血us　established　signifies　the
stable　lluman　relatlonship　between　people，　and　can　guarantee　the
stability　of　a　s㏄iety．　It　is　to　be　remembered　that　the　stability　of　a　society
sp㏄ifically　signifies　the　stability　of　the　sent㎞ents　of　the　people　in　the
SOClety．
　　Smith，s　explanation　sensitively　captures　a　new　kind　of　human
relationship　in　an　expanding　co血mercial　society　where　the　domilla血9
human　relatiollship　is　tllat　witll　an　indefinite　number　of　anonymous
pcrsons．　In　such　a　society，　one　has　to　behave　i　1　a　way　that　is　approved　by
people　With　whom　he　has　no　contact　either　beforehand　or　afterward．
4．Problems　of　Smith響s　Theory　of　Sympathy
However，　some　problems　immediately　seem　to　follow　from　Smi止゜s
Hume’s　Gencral　Point　of　View　and　Smith’s　lmpania　1　Spectator　77
theory．　F廿st，　as　Haakonssen　points　ou伊），　Smith　does　not　explain　how　it
is　possible　fbr　a　spectator　to　recognize　a　sentiment　or　a　motive　of　a
person　apart丘om　the　action　itself　perfbrmed　by　that　person．　The
emotion　of　other　people　is　hidden　behind　the　veil　of　privacy；the
motivation　of　an　action　is　not　a　direct　object　of　observation．　In　order　fbr
acomparison　to　be　possible，　one　has　to　be　able　to　recogniZe　the　emotion
of　the　other　person　with　a　reasonable　degree　of　accuracy．（5）But　it　d㏄s
not　seem　to　wotk　in　any　e伍cient　mamer，　if　the　othefs　emotion　is　not　in
principle　knowal）le．
　　S㏄ond，　according　to　Smith，　a　moral　observer　p血iarily　deals　with　the
emotion　of　an　actor，　and　sees　whether　he°can　go　along　With，　it，　were　he
in　the　place　of　that　actor．　But　the　motivatio血of　an　action　is　not　usually
an　emotion，　nor　can　the　motivation　be　merely　reduced　to　an　emotion．　So
if　the　spectator　tries　tO　evaluate　the　propriety　of　the　motivation，　he　has　to
use　some　other　criterion　than　simple　emotion　to　see’if　the　motivation　is
appropriate．　But　this　will　cause　Smith　to　abandon　his　theory　of　moral
selltiment．
　　Furthemlore，　Smith　provides　us　with　a　still　more　dif丘cult　problem．
According　to　Smith，　in　order　for　sympathy　tQ　obtain，　bilateral　efforts　are
required；one　is　required　on　the　part　of　an　observer　to　strengthen　his
emotion，　and　the　other　is　required　on　the　part　of　the　person　primarily
concemed　to　weaken　his　emotion．　These　two　effo】雌，　when　combilled，
first　enable　the　conc㎜・ence　of　tWo　different　emotions．　It　is　not，　however，
clear　how　it　is　possible　fbr　a　third　person　to　supervise　these　bilateral
processes，　unless　they　engage　in　a　face－to－face　negotiation　like　in　a
market．⑤
Smith　assumes　that　hamony　of　people雪s　sentiments　signifies　in　a
precise　manner　the　hamony　of血e　whole　reality　of　the　society　and血e
harmony　of　human　relationships　in　the　society．　But　it　is　ollly　an
mwa㎜ted　presupposition　that　a　condition　of　all　emotion　rβpresents　the
reality，　and　that　dle　hamony　between血e　emotions　of　different　people
designates　the　hamony　of　the　underlying　reality．
5．Impa面a艮Spectator
　　Smith　is　not　unaware　of　these　problems．　Smi血thinks　that，　in　a　society
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that　is　composed　of　allonymous　people，　one，s　behaviour　can　be　moral
when　people　who　have　no　prior　personal　relationship　with　him　approve
it．　hl　this　case，　it　would　not　be　necessaπy　to　make　sure　that　no　one　has
o切ection　about　the　verdict．　Because　an　anonymous　member　is　the
objective　criterion，　if　one　r｛rPresentative　spectator　acknowledges　some
behaviour，　it　means　that　the　action　has　obtained　the　recognition　of　the
society　as　a　whole．
　　V岡hen　Smith　fmst　i血troduces　the　concept　of　an　hnpartial　spectator　i血
the　first　edition　of　his刀ieory　of　Moral　Sentiments，　he　means　by　the
concept　just　such　a　spectator．（7）
　　And　hence　it　is，　that敦）fbel　much　fbr　d血ers　and　liUle　fbr　ourselves，
that　to　restrain　our　selfish，　and　to　indulge　our　benevolent　affections，
consti加tes血e　perfectiOn　of　human　matUre；and　can　alone　pro血ce
among　mankind　that　hamony　of　sent㎞㎝ts　and　passions㎞which
corsists血eir　whole　gIace　and　propdety．　As舷）love　our　neighbOur　as　we
love　ourselves蛤血鳩9顧eat㎞of　Chrisdanity，　so　it　is　the　g甑P！脚t　of
na加e　tO　love　ourselves　as　we　love　our　neighiX川r，　or　what　comes　tr）the
same　thin＆as　our　neighbOur　iS　c司pable　of　loving　us（TMS　p．25）．（8）
　　To　behave　morally　means　to　behave　in　such　a　manner　that　an　impartial
tllird　person　would　approve　of　it．　When　the　moral　behaviour　of　other
people　is　apProved　by　a　thhd　person，血e　behaviour　is　supPosed　to　be
approved　unanimously　by　all　the　me血bers　of　the　society．　This　represents
a　minimum　morality．〔9）And　this　third　person　is　what　Smith　means　by　the
impartial　spectator．　Smi血曾s　impartia1　spectator　specifically　refers　to　an
ordinary　person　who　has　no　personal　interest　in　the　situation．　Moral
behaViour　is　impania1　not　because　of　itS　mherent　impartiality　but　because
of　its　bei　19　apProved　by　an　impartial　spectator．
　　One　of　the　problems　that　are　indicated　above　sees　the　possibility　of
solution　with　the　notion　of　tlle　impartial　spectator．　It　would　not　be
necessary　for　both　parties　to　make　an　effort　to　attain　the　concurrence　of
theh・sentiments．　The　seni㎞ent　of　the　impartial　spectator　fUnctions　as　the
standard　fbr　correct　moral　sentiments．　Now　all　that　is　necessary　fbr
obtai血9　propriety　is　to　adopt　the　sentiment　of｛an　impartial　spectator．
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　　People　can　make　a　right　judgement　abOut　．themselves　only　if　they　can
pretend　themselves　a　third　person　when　considering　their　own　morality．
Let　us　remember　that　this　signifies　the　understanding　of　morality　that
regards°social　validityl　rather　than　any　panicular　no】rmative　position　as
the　standard　of　morality．　Therefore，　the　ftUidamenta1　characteristic　of　the
impartial　spectator　is　that　he　is　considered　as　a　representative　of　an
ordinary　member　of　the　society，　and　not　as　a　God－1ike　being，　orr　niscient，
omnipotent，　and　universal．
6．Smith曾s　Demigod
　　However，　Smith曾s　d㏄trine　takes　a　cmcial　tum　regard　ng　the　concept
of　the㎞partial　spectator．　It　is血asense　a　development　that　is　waitillg　to
hapPen．　Soon　a丘er　the　publicadon　of　the　fmst　edidon　of　7乃e　71heoりy　qヂ
Moral　Sentiments，　Gilbert　Eliot　questioned　how　it　was　possible　in
Smith，s　theory　that　one曾s　conscience　could　go　against　popular　opinion．（10）
In　response　to　this　criticism，　Smith　addS　a　major　correction　to　the　role　of
hnpartial　spectator　in　the　2ad　edition　of　the　7heoリノofMoral　5セπガ〃zent．（11）
Smith　hopes　in　llis　letter　to　Eliot　that叩on　the　readmg　of　the　2nd　edition，
［Elhot］wi皿observe　that　it　is　in伽ded　botb　to　oon㎞my　Doc血e　that
our　judgenients　conceming　our　own　con（㎞㏄㎞・e瓠照ys　a　re㎞1㏄め
the　sentirnents　of　some　other　being　and　to　show・thaち　notW紬standing
this，　nd　magna㎡血1y　and　oonsci㎝s　v㎞e　can聯）茸itselfmder出e
disapProbation　of　ad　mankin（工（12）
　　This　distinction　already　presupposes　the　difference　between　actual
pfaise　and　the　praise－worthiness．　In　its　essence，　this　is　typically　a
question　regarding　vanity．（13）Vanity　is　defined　as　an　attitUde　to　love
praise　itself　even　if　one　is　not　at　all　praiseworthy．　It　is　to　be　noted　that　the
distinction　betweell　actUal　praise　and　praise。wortllilless　is　exclusively
concerned　with　a　moral　evaluation　about　oneself’　ln　so　far　as　one　acts　as
adisinterested　spectator，　there　can　be　no　contradiction　betWeen　the　actual
praise　and　praise－worthiness．（14）Smith　says　that　the　problem　of
conscience　is　peculiar　to　selfLevaluation．℃onscience，　orders　without
regard　to，　a血d　often　in　defiance　of，　public　ophlions．　This　is　precisely　the
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development　that　Smith　amounces　in　the　subtitle　of　his　book　Smith
proceeds　to　analyse　the　principles　by　which　mell　naturally　judge　tlle
conduct　and　character　of　themselves．
　　In　1血e　2nd　and　especially　h11血e　6血editioll　of　Chapter　2，　Part　30f　t血e
Theory｛）f　Moral　Sentiment，　Smith　discusses　in　detail　the　di　fferences
betWeen　actUal　praise　and　praise－wor血iness，　or　actUal　blame　and　blame－
worthiness．　The　underlying　implication　of　his　criticism　of　vanity　is
S血th，s　criticism　of　Mandeville．　It　is　in　this　process　that　he　introduces　the
conc印t　of　ldemigod，　or壁the　man　within　the　breast壁（TMS　p．131）．㈹
　Smith　thinks　that　the　love　toward　praise－wor血iness　camot　be　derived
from　the　love　of　praise　itself　For，　the　love　of　praise　is　desirable　only
when　the　praise　is　given　to　the　action　that　is　truly　praiseworthy．　The
poillt　is　that，　here，　praise－worthiness　has　tlle　priority　over　the　actual
praise．　Smith　refUses　to　base　the　desirability　of　praise－worthhless　oll　the
actual　plaise丘om　the　public．　And　the　reason　why　praise－worthiness　has
P］riority　is　that　it　is　nothhlg　but　the　verdict　of　the　conscience．　This　is
fbunded　upon　Smith曾s　theoly　that　prescribes　the　priority　of血e］right　over
血egood．　And血e　strict　correspOndence　between　the］right　and　the　good
can　be　fbund　nowhere　else　otller　than　in　the　presupposition　that　the
sympathy　of　an　impartial　spectator　shoUld　always　be　correct．
　　Then　Smith　takes　the　course　of　escalating　his　dependency　on　the
theological　assumption丘om　the　impartial　spectator　to　ltlle　demigod
Within血e　breastl　and　to　lthe　all－seeing　Judge　of　tthe　world，（TMS　p．131），
from　the　first　tribunal　by　the　actual　spectator，　to　the　tribunal　of
conscience　and　firrther　to，the　unerring　rectitUde’　of　God，s　lgreat面bmar
（lbid．）．（1のThis　is　precisely　the　reverse　course血at　Smith　undertook　as　he
first　introduced　the　concept　of　sympathy　as　a　critical　depa血1re丘om
Hutcheson．
　　Tlle　development　of　the　concept　of　Smith’s　moral　observer　is　in　a
sense　a　necessaly　consequence　of　his　theory　of　symPathy．　Smi血th血ks
that　sympat血y　is　a　plocess　completed　in　the　mind　of　the　observer　who　is
equipped　wi血his　own　moral　criterio11．　Therefbre血e　justificatioll　of
sympathy　ultimately　depends　on　the　qualification　of　the　observer．　So
long　as　sy田pathy　is　s叩posed　to　be　the　illitial　moral　criterion，　tbere　is　no
other　means　for　decidng　the　priority　among　competing　mora1　opmions，
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other血an　by　exam㎞g　the　persons　who　hold　each　oP㎞on，・rather　than
the　contents　of　the　oP血ions　themselves．　That　is「why　Smith　upgrades　the
㎞partial　spectator丘om　ordinary　pθople，　to　the　inner　man，　to　the　great
demi－god　within血e　breast，　and　finally　to　the　all－seeing　Jndge．
　　hl　this　way，　Smith°s　impartial　spectatOr　a伽ins　a　VieWPoint　of　seeing
a11．　However，　this曹all－seeing　Judge　of　the　world賢is　anything　but血e
ordinary　people　who　constitute　the　s㏄iety　to　which　Smith　tries　to　give
philosophical　fbundation．（塵η
7．Sinith’s　Criticism　of　Hume　and　Hume’s　General　Point　of　View
　　In　the　last　part　of　this　discussion，　I　have　tried　to　highlight　the
theological　aspect　in　which　Smith　fbunds　the　last　resort　of　moral
worthiness　in　divine　providence．　It　would　be　wrong　to　regard　it　as　a
negligible　lreminiscence　of　his　t血1e．　Smith　criticizes　Hume　on　the　ground
that　the　considcration　of　result　can　never　be　the　ground　of　moral　value．
Although　Smith　does　not　mention　the　name，　presumably　out　of
，propriety’to　his　best」hiend，　there　are　some　places　in　The　theory　of
Moral　SentimentS　that　Smith　apparently　has　Hume　in　mind　as　his　target
of　criticism．
　　In　their　well一㎞own　conresl恥ndence，　S血th　confimls　that　his　concept
of　s卿曲y漁面om　H㎜e’s．（18）hspite　of　H㎜els町cas廿c　tone，　it
is　not　of　course　a　minor　difference　of　op血ions，　and　Smith°s　whole　theory
tries　to　present　his　alternative　to　Hume，s　work．（19）Most　important　of　all，
Smith　classifies　and　criticises　Hume’s　theory　as　a　doct血1e　that　seeks　the
p血ciple　of　approva1　in　utility．　Let　me　quote　the　relevant　passages．
The　ut血ty　of　those（Iualities（NB　intellec加al　Virtues　dlat　command　our
紬血tiori），　it　may　be血⑫ち捻W㎞㎞t㈱㎜曲血㎝醐；
and　no　doUbg　the　ccmsideration　of血s，　when　we　come　tO　attmd　－to　ig
gives血cm　a　new　value．　Ohgina皿y，　however，　we－apProve　of｛another
㎜’sjudgem㎝ちnot　as　some面㎎use飼」bUt　as　righ9　as　a㏄curate，　as
agloe註1）le　tO　tUth　and　reality：and　it　is　evident　we　a轍those　qua血ties
眠）it　fer　no　o血er　reason　but　b㏄ause　we血d　1血at　it　agroes　wi丑1（n　r　own．
Taste，　in　the　salne　nコanncr，　is　origina皿y　apPmvα玉of，　not　as　use飢bロt　as
jusちas　delicate，　and　as　p】recisely　sui爬d　to　its　objeCt．　The　idea　of　the
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u曲ty　of　all（ltlitlities　ofthis　kind　is　plainly　an血一伽㎏比孤d　not　wl凱
血就reco㎜曲血em　to　our　approbation（TMS　p．20）．
That　system　Which　plaoes　virtue　in　utility，　oo血cides　too　wilh　that　which
makes　it　consist　in　pr　qpriety．　Accolding　to廿血s　sys甑al［those　qualities
of血e　mind　which　are　agree自ble　or　advantageoりs，　either　to　the　pe1son
hhnself　or　to　others，　are　apProved　of　as　vimous，　and　the　contrary
disapproved　of　as　vicious．　But　the　agreeableness　or　utility　of　any
affection　depends　upon　the　deg墾㏄which＼it　is　allowed　to　sUbsist　in．
Every　affection　is　usefUI　when　it　is　co血ed　to　a　certai皿degree　of
mod㎝ho蝿皿d　ev創y　a齢㎝is（lisadvantageous　when　it　exceed曲e
preper　bOundS．　A舳9舳s卵s㎞血繭亜e，曲e　oomis髄ot血
any　one　affeedon，　but　in　the　lnpper　degree’of　all　the　af圓ons．　The　only
difference　between　it　alld　that　which　I　llave　been　endeavou㎡皿g　to
estab止軌蛤，廿）at　it　malces　utility，　and　not　sympa血y，　or　the　correSPondent
affeCtion　of　the　SpeCtator，血e　na加ml　and　original　measure　of血is　pn叩ur
degree（mS　p．306）．
Smith　apparently　understands　Hume°s　sympathy　as　based　on　utility．
But　Smith，s　understanding　needs　correction．　First，　Hume　is　not　a
uti血tarian　in　that　he　does　not　maintain　that　what　i血creases　the　total　utility
of　a　society　is　morally　good．　He　maintains　that　what　is　morally　good　is
perceived　as　such　because　of　its　causal　effect　that　is　either　utility　or
agreeableness，　and　nothing　else．　Sy卑pathy　is　a　means　to　obtain　those
perceptions　befbre　the　agent　is　ready　to　make　a　moral　judg㎝ent．　This
assumes　the　priority　of　the　good　over　the　right，　which　is　opposit　to
Smith’s　idea．　If　moral　judgement　is，　as　Smith　clams，　only　concemed　with
the　propriety　of　sent㎞ents，　its　role　is　to　tell　if　something　is　right　or
wrong．　It　ca【mot　explain　the　formation　of　the　mora1　norms．（20）
　　Humels　sy卑pathy　explaills　how　it　is　possible　that　people　ca血share　the
sentiments　of　other　people　even　if　they　do　not　experience　the　same
situation　ill　person．　In　this　way，　Hume，s　sympathy　is　a　means　of
communication，　and　explains　the　mechanism　by　which　we　share　the
moral　situation．　On　the　other　hand，　Smith　does　not　explain　how　it　is
possible　for　a　spectator　tO　recognise　a　mora1　sitUation　in　the　first　place．（21）
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Smith　takes　it　fbr　granted　that　the　spectator　and　the　agent　can　share　an
mderstanding　of　the　situation．　But　that　is　an　illegitimate　leap　that　Hume
detemines　not　to　allow　in　his，Science　of　Manl．　Smith　with　the
development　of　the　concept　of　impartial　spectator　chooses，　in　efiiect，　to
make　his　theory　of　sympathy　a　monologue　or　a血inner　dialogue　with
God，　which　is　to　be　compensated　fbr　by　divine　providence．　His
separation　of　efficient　cause　from　final　cause　corresponds　to　this
picture．（22）
　　The血eological　assulnption　of　Smith，s　theory　is　not　to　be　f（）und　in　his
explicitly　theological　phrases（23），　but　rather　in　his　multi－1ayered
assumption　that　the　individual　human　be血g　has　a　vicegere血wi曲his
heart，　and　that　the　moral　judgement　based　on　his　senimentS　represents
the　hamlony　of　a　wel1－ordered　society。　　　　　　　　　　　’
　　Unlike　Hume，　Smith曹s　adherence　to　natural　law　theory　and　his　reliance
on　final　cause　has　prevented　him　from　develophlg　a　tlleory　based　on
ef丘cient　cause．（24）Smith°s　moral　philosophy　deals　with　the　tlleory　of
judgement　that　occasions　the　moral　order　based　on　providence；while
H㎜e㎞es　to　expla㎞血e　formation　of　the　mora1　order　itSelf丘om　human
na加re．
Unlike　S血血曾s　notion　of　the　impartial　spectator　who　sees　all，　Hume，s
general　point　of　view　provides　a　view　that　is　only　general．　Humels
general　point　of　view　is　not　even　a　device　fbr　judgement，　but　merely
represe皿ts　a　perception　of　the　sitUation．　Senthnents　of　sy卑pathy　obtai血ed
from　the　general　point　of　view　assume　a　generality　in　the　sense　that　they
are　in　P］dnciple　accessible　to　people血1　general，　because，　unm（e　Smithian
impartiality，　it　does　not　primanly　depend　on　a　particular　faculty　of　the
observeri　And　the　perception　of　the　observer　naturally　prescribes　the
most　appropriate　action　to　be　taken　in　a　situation．　In　this　way，　Hume曹s
mora1　perception　explains　moral　motivation．
ln　Hume，　morality　has　more　to　do　with血e㎞（lamenta1　orientation　of
huma血behaviour　that　is　represented　by　custom，　rather　than　some　specific
rules　for　sorting　out　behaviour　among　indepelldent　individua貰s．（25）
Humean　sympathy　works　on　behalf　of　the　person　concemed，　while
Smithian　sympathy　works　on　behalf　of　divine　providence．　Tllis　is
re血ected　in　the　fact血at　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　explains　how　human
relationships　come　to　be　harmonised　with　the　emergence　of　civil　society，
while　Smith　deals　with　the　commutative　justice　by　presupPosing
independent　individuals　in　order　to　maintain　the　already　established
social　order．（26）Therefbre，　despite　their　chronological　order，　Smith’s
mora1　philosophy　cannot　be　a　develqpment　of　Hume，s　lScience　of　Man．，（2n
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　　ノldUm　Smith　ed．　by　Andrew　Skinner（1975）p．91．
（13）Th叩oblern　of㍉vanity’has　been　the　oentiUl，　if　inconSpicuous，　pmb1㎝血the　history
　　of　Wes加m画los叩hy．　E胡p㏄皿y，　in　pre，modern　British　ph皿osqphy，　it　o㏄ゆes　a
　　o㎝【tral　plaoe’　because　of止e血tdllectual　challenge　made　by　Hobbes　and　Mat｝devi皿e，
　　and　because　of　the　influenoe　ofα血ianity．　Hume　develops　1血血omy　of　Syrrrpathy
　　centr血1g　on廿le　ooncq｝t　of　lPride　and　humi血tプapParently　i　l　de丘an㏄of　1励donal
　　Ch説an　vセ加障，　and　converted　it　as吐re　base　of　social　unificatio1L
（14）That　iS　derived　tbOm血e　plbb㎞of　how重o　base　the　non．ernpirical◎o聯pちse1£
　　With画且血e㎞ewod【ofenlpidcal　eXPlanation」
（！5）　In　the　2nd　edition，　Smith　still　represents　an　ambivalent　posidon　between　pUblic
　　qp㎞on血oo蘭㎝㏄．1ゆd画s（航楓，On血｝o㏄㎞d　S㎡th　wanted　to
　　Ie㎞the岱通並onal　vicw血at伍e　voi㏄of　oonscience　r騨nts　the　voi㏄of　God
　　Im曲s哩鴫dor紋｝pq画qph亘㎝On｛he　o血cr㎞d　he　beheved吐旧t　oonsci㎝㏄is
　　血i佃1y　an　e舳ct　of　s㏄j湖a⑳mval　and　d珈mval；血血e血st血舘m㏄，　vα」t　papuli
　　iS　vox・Dei．　The　Au血of　of　na加e　has　made　man　the　immediate　judge　of　mank血¢
　　凪d励魎麟as血㎜y　o血颯㎜㎞㎞血㎞o㎜螂，　of漉
　　㎞（TMS　p．128）．l　Alt血ou帥develc卸oonsci㎝㏄is　a　superior　Uibuna】」曾yet」if
　　we　enq晦血血）the　origin　of　its　instiu血on，　its　jurisdiction，　we　sha皿血¢is血ag1em
　　measure　de㎡鴨d丘om　the　authority　of　that　very　nibunal，　whose　d㏄面（ms　it　so　o㎞
　　and　so　justly　roverses（TMS　p．129）．’
　　　　In　the　6血editio恥血e　above　quotations　are　removed　as　Smith　emphasises血e
　　priori電y　of　conscien㏄．　However，　if　the蜘a1　Spectator　reaches　diflrerent　verdict
　　㎞the　ophlion　of重he　general　public，　it　must　be　because　the　ilnpa劃虚al　spec亀a吐or
　　possesses　his　own　eriterian　of　mam1　judgrment　Howeve【，　Smiオh　does　not　exp㎞
　　止e㎜son，　nor　does　he曲k　it　n㏄㈹yめ暫ve㎝e．　It　is　based　on　a　ce血血self－
　　eVidmt　PS∋surPPositionL
（16）Cf】⑳hadσ975）p．94．
（17）According　to　Smith，　our　’happiness　in　this　life　is　thus，　upon　many　occasions，
　　d卿d㎝tupDn血e　humble　hope　and　expec励on　of　a　life　to　come：ahope　and
　　麟血on〔助㎜励h㎜撫；働曲e㎎輪lo靭i伽of
　　its　dignity；can　alone　i皿umj血a加血e　d町pmspect　of　ltS　cont血ua皿y騨h血9
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　　mo蘭ty，　and　mai皿加血its　cheerfiiness　under　a皿出e　heaviest　c曲㎡des　tO　which
　　丘℃皿1血ie　disarims　dfthis　1ife，　it　may　some血nes　be　exposed（TMS　p．132）．曾
（18）See　R㏄eder（1997）p．13．
（19）　See（TMS　p．327）．
（20）NormatiVity　concerns　more　Wi止mo圃㈱og面on｛㎞舳m㎝即pmval　or
　　diSapprova1．
（21）S血紐1di曲gl曲es　mo囮1㎜gni廿㎝fbm　mota11脚mval．　But曲in伽makes
　　moral　sentiments　redundant　fbr　moral　recognition，　becomse　any　o切ective
　　reoognition　of　a　mora1　situation　alone　should◎o騨1曲㎝e　mo田1　judgm㎝L
（22）　In　the　77heonyソofMoral　Sentimen」tS，　Smi血面ed　to　establish　the　theory　of　ear皿y
　　jus虹ce，　by　lmsupPosing仕鳩（㎞雪s　justi㏄．　Buち㎞Smith」b㏄cause　the　ea血1y　justice
　　is　mode皿ed　on　the　high　Uibunal　of（斌it　is㎜de　possible㎝1y㎞u窪h　the　d血㏄t
　　血tervention　ofthe　proVidence　of（M
（23）Cf（TMS　pp。128－130，　p．166）．
（24）Cf．　Cla　lk，　C．MA．，”Adam　Smith　and　Socicty　as　an　Evolutionary　P⑩㏄ss”，　A伽
　　Smith　Critt’cal　A∬e∬伽，　VoL皿Routledge，1994，　pp．151－168，　e写p．，　pp．163－
　　164．
（25）See　my，ldm）m　as　the　Humean　Altemative　to　Locke曾s　A㎞t　Ideasl¢Bulletin　of
　　Keiwa（7011ege　10，2001．
（26）See　my閃JUstice　and出．e　Stabi血重y　of　PIppe随y　hl　Hume”BUtletin　ofKeiwa（rollege　9，
　　2000．
（27）This　pgper　was　de1量vered　at　the　conference°，The　S◎ottish　Enlightenment　in　its
　　Eu顧opean　Con加xtl曾at翫こlnive附ゴケ（～f　Glasgow，　Ap㎡［2001，　undcr　1山e　auspice　of
　　t乃e　BritZ’sh　sanンメbγ訪θ働如り，　ofl「物伽q頭γ．
